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College English

Rewriting Composition: Moving beyond
a Discourse of Need

Bruce Horner

If oppositional strategies are conducted from within the same framework as that which they
oppose, they run the danger of reproducing those same positions.
—Alastair Pennycook (“English as a Language Always in Translation” 43)
Just because [compositionists] have been funded with a reductionist notion of our task has not
meant that we have been bound to follow through in a reductionist way.
—Charles Bazerman (“Response” 252)

omposition is an ongoing historical project: the name given to work done in
colleges and universities, mostly in the United States, by students and teachers as they engage and mediate differences in written language. That is the
definition I am willing to offer, knowing that it is at best only a beginning
and necessarily incomplete.
Composition’s difficulties arise in part out of the tension built into the term
itself as a referent for not only an activity and the product of that activity, but also
the material social conditions of that activity: not only what is understood to be the
composing process(es) of individual students or groups of students (or other writers) and the textual products of these processes, but also the full panoply of material
social conditions and practices out of and within which such processes and products
appear—the “field” of composition, composition programs, and the history of these.
Hence composition may be used to refer not only to a kind of text and the means by
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which such texts are produced, but also and at the same time to the authors of such
texts, the courses in which they deploy particular means to produce such texts, the
programs responsible for such courses—their design, staffing, and maintenance—and
the professional academic disciplinary participation in and study of the programs,
courses, students, texts, and activities by which those texts are produced in relation
to one another—Composition writ large.
The undeniable location of the work of this Composition in material social
history (compare, for example, biology) distinguishes the difficulties besetting it—its
lack of academic institutional status and the working conditions and perquisites attending such status—from the difficulties of definition and purpose experienced by
other disciplines as they revisit, redefine, and defend their terms, aims, procedures,
and value (see, for example, Burawoy; Firth and Wagner), in keeping with their own
location in material social history. For although every discipline faces on occasion
the challenge of self (re)definition (think of the range of scientific fields that have
arisen in the last century), few are defined in terms of their material social location
within academic institutions or identified with that location, as composition is. Instead, following the ideology of professional academic disciplinarity, most deny that
location in defining themselves.1
Dominant efforts to respond to the very real difficulties of those working in
composition (as students, teachers, scholars), rather than engaging composition’s
location and character as material social practice, have followed the lead of these
other fields. In so doing, they have accepted dominant culture’s limited conceptions
and valuations of composition as low, limited, preparatory, illegitimate. Such efforts
produce and maintain a “discourse of need” about composition itself, defining it as
lacking what dominant culture identifies as legitimate disciplinary characteristics
and therefore as in need of either abandonment or supplement.2 So, for example,
graduate programs to prepare teachers of courses in composition are themselves
dubbed not programs in composition but, instead, in Rhetoric and Composition;
Writing Studies; Writing, Rhetoric, and American Culture; Rhetoric, Composition,
and Literacy Studies; Critical Studies in Literacy and Pedagogy; Language, Literacy,
and Rhetoric; or Composition and Cultural Rhetoric (compare Hesse xii).
Clearly, there is use in exploring interrelationships between composition as I
have defined it earlier and work identified with these other terms. Nonetheless, it
is worth questioning the assumptions driving a discourse attempting to identify, or
replace, composition with these other terms. In that discourse of need, the work of
composition serves as foil to the alternatives (or supplements) that are proposed, and
both the work of composition and the proposed alternatives are removed from their
location in time and (social) space as always emergent, fluctuating, material social
practices. Thus ideological misrecognitions (in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense) aligned
with dominant cultural identifications of both composition work and the proposed
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alternatives are achieved, as evidenced in the gap between, on the one hand, representations of either and, on the other, actual practices and locations: the ongoing
history of composition work in the United States and elsewhere of students, teachers,
scholars. And, thus, both the promise and ongoing daily accomplishments of work
in composition go unrecognized, while alternatives occluding these are heralded.
Commodifications of knowledge and learning are substituted for the ongoing work
of knowing and learning, and dispositions of flexibility in keeping with fast capitalist
dictates are pursued as ideals.
I argue that to break with this discourse of need and give full play to all that
might and does get accomplished in the work of composition, we need to rethink
terms used to define, and limit, composition: writing, pedagogy, theory, modality, and
composition itself. This is difficult insofar as it entails engaging dominant representations of composition to call them into question: to think of both the existing terms
of our work and also the terms we would exchange them for differently, lest we
unwittingly lapse into accepting what the dominant predisposes us to recognize as
the “new,” “alternative,” and “different” as new, alternative, and so on, and, more
significantly, as preferable to what the dominant predisposes us to recognize as the
old and inadequate, and thereby to operate within the very terms of exchange set
by the dominant. Moreover, rethinking the terms used to define composition is difficult insofar as it requires that we acknowledge both the effectivity, on the ground,
of dominant representations of composition work (and their officially designated
alternatives) and, simultaneously, their inadequacy. Finally, this is difficult insofar as
many of us are disposed, by our misrecognition of the very material social conditions
enabling our participation in such rethinking, to conceive of both our task and the
subject of our task in immaterial terms. In other words, rethinking the terms of work
for composition necessarily requires rethinking the work of theory itself as material
social practice, a “process in society” and “social intervention,” as Stephen Resnick
and Richard Wolff put it (2, 3), not opposed to material social practice but instead
itself a particular form of material social practice.
To illustrate the depth of the reach of the discourse of need over the last decade
and its limiting characteristics, I first consider as a case in point the operation of that
same discourse in two seemingly opposed calls for ending composition that have appeared during the past ten years—David Smit’s The End of Composition Studies and
Sidney Dobrin’s Postcomposition. Smit’s book calls for an end to composition studies
in light of its apparent failure to fulfill its official institutional charge of writing skills
transmission, whereas Dobrin’s book calls for moving “post” composition as a way to
abandon the attempt to do so. But for my purposes here, what is compelling about
these two works is their alignment in accepting the dominant’s definition of composition, despite their opposition to one another, and thus their joint participation
in that discourse of need, demonstrating its reach across apparent divides. I analyze
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the apocalyptic rhetoric found in both to help bring into sharp relief the assumptions and moves driving not only their arguments but, as I will show, those deployed
in seemingly less apocalyptic, but increasingly pervasive, calls to expand or move
beyond or supplement composition in light of its perceived lack—the participation
of all such arguments in that same discourse of need.
That discourse can be identified by the following interlocking assumptions
and moves:
• Writing, at least as practiced in composition, is treated as a stable, internally uniform
entity.
• Teaching is treated as the transmission of the ability to produce that stable entity “writing.”
• Power relations are treated as set rather than subject to and in constant need of reworking, with hegemonic relations of power what the argument is either resigned or aligned
to, leading consequently to change being understood in apocalyptic terms as tragic
resistance, revolution, and/or violent breaks with the past.
• The past itself is treated as a known, finite, and stable entity discrete and different from
what is claimed to be current or new.
• Difference is understood as deviation from a norm of sameness rather than an inevitable
characteristic of all writing, including writing that is conventionally identified as “the
same.”
• Theory is treated as an escape from practice rather than a practice itself with material
social effects, encouraging blindness to the alignment of theoretical practice aimed at
the “different” with dominant ideology and its reinforcement of that ideology.

These assumptions govern efforts to understand and address composition’s
difficulties, shaping not just the solutions various such efforts provide but also the
definitions of the problems to be addressed. As I will argue, these assumptions
thereby perversely reinforce the very difficulties prompting these efforts. Drawing
on the strategies deployed in J. K. Gibson-Graham’s critique of “capitalocentric”
(Postcapitalist 2) discourse in economics and Theresa Lillis’s critique of the treatment
of writing in sociolinguistics (Sociolinguistics), I outline an alternative approach to
addressing real limitations in disciplinary discourse, using James Slevin’s argument
for composition as intellectual work (Introducing English) to illustrate such strategies,
and I sketch a reworking of the seemingly “ordinary” in composition as one means
of deploying such strategies.
It’s worth emphasizing that the challenges facing those working in composition
to which this discourse of need responds are real, hence there is genuine exigence for
the efforts of all those participating in that discourse, whatever questions arise about
the specific directions those efforts take. These challenges include, among many others, the perduring poor working conditions for those teaching composition; highly
questionable staffing of course sections and student placement and exit procedures;
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conservatism in program administration and pedagogy; and the seeming impotence
of those working in composition to withstand institutional and larger sociopolitical
pressures on the definition, conduct, conditions, and valuation of their work. But,
ironically, the discourse of need ends up leaving these unchallenged: understood at
best as “problems” rather than problematics. Alternatively, I argue for engaging the
ongoing, necessary, inevitable rewriting of composition, a possibility that appears
once we recognize its always emergent, varied, and changing character.
Composition

as

Failed Delivery

of

Marketable Writing Skill

Smit’s The End of Composition Studies offers one permutation of this discourse of need.
In his book, Smit defines composition strictly in terms of pedagogy, understood as
the transmission of knowledge of how to write (tout court) to students, in the form of
general writing skills, in a first-year composition (FYC) course, that will be applicable
to future challenges students face elsewhere: “Broadly speaking,” he asserts, “the goal
of composition studies is to promote the use of writing: to help people acquire the
knowledge and skill they need to convey what they want to say when they put pen
to paper or fingers to the keyboard” (1). However, given the apparent inability of
research to date to demonstrate any general writing skills and the apparent tendency
of writers only to “acquire” skills at writing in particular ways through immersion in
specific communities of practice, Smit concludes that composition needs to end. In
other words, the work of composition is understood in terms of the official charge
assigned to it by institutional and other authorities, a charge that it appears unable
to meet and so should resign from attempting; instead, it must redirect its energies
toward facilitating the kind of acquisition of skill in writing in particular ways, in
specific disciplines, that Smit thinks does occur.
Although it might seem, from this account, that Smit recognizes the instability
and variability of writing, in fact Smit uses writing in two contradictory senses.3 On
the one hand, he uses it in the singular as a noncount noun condensing all activities
and products associated with the term into a single, uniform entity: writing. This is
the meaning he invokes in the “basic” questions that he argues composition needs
to return to—“What is writing? How is writing learned? Can writing be taught, and
if so, in what sense? And if writing can be taught, how should it be taught?” (2). On
the other hand, he also uses writing to refer to a broad range of highly differentiated
practices and products—what scholars of writing (including “composition” scholars)
have for some time now documented (see, for example, Lea and Street, “Student”;
Thaiss and Zawacki). Smit defines composition as tied indelibly to the first understanding of writing, hence the need for composition to come to an end. In other words,
because he defines pedagogy as the transmission of a single codified and fixed set of
skills and knowledge, whether through explicit instruction or through scaffolding or
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some other means, the inability of researchers to identify a universal set of these for
writing (or, conversely, researchers’ findings of myriad shifting kinds of skills and
knowledge involved in writing) leads him to the conclusion that composition is at a
(dead) end: there appears to be no single set of forms and skills, or even knowledge
about these, to transmit, and worse, even if there were, they don’t seem to “transfer”
to sites beyond FYC.4 Thus, Smit’s assumption of a transmission model of pedagogy
and a uniform concept of writing at odds with what compositionists in fact recognize
paints him (or the field) into a corner: as he puts it, “[N]o one ever learned to write
primarily by completing a two-course sequence in writing at a college or university”
(182). So he proposes a WID-like alternative as the only viable option.
Smit’s concluding position is aligned with an acceptance of status quo power
relations as set. His argument thus exemplifies what Mary Lea and Brian Street have
identified as an academic socialization model of academic literacy, characterized as being
concerned with students’ acculturation into disciplinary and subject-based discourses
and genres. Students acquire the ways of talking, writing, thinking, and using literacy
that typified [sic] members of a disciplinary or subject area community. The academic
socialization model presumes that the disciplinary discourses and genres are relatively
stable, and once students have learned and understood the ground rules of a particular
academic discourse, they are able to reproduce it unproblematically. (“The ‘Academic
Literacies’ Model” 369)

As Smit himself puts it, “[W]riting is a process of socialization, of novice writers
learning to use writing as a tool in order to accomplish particular tasks that they find
meaningful and useful or in order to belong to social groups who can use writing
as a means of participating in the group” (61, emphasis in original; see also 182).
Smit thus adopts what social theorist Anthony Giddens has identified as a normative
functionalist reading of institutions and social practices: things are as they are and
operate as they do because that is what their appropriate function is.5 In this reading,
official accounts of apprenticeship models are taken as both the full and normative
representation of them: the conditions and practices that we should aspire to. Such
an approach ascribes to institutions and institutional processes the nature and value
of what they officially claim to be, and thus reinforces status quo relations of power
and the practices maintaining these. While the institution and institutional practices
of composition are defined as dysfunctional, work in disciplines outside composition
and outside the academy is treated as functional, its processes and contours right—
functioning normatively—by virtue of being as they are.
This alignment of Smit’s position with a normative functionalist perspective can
best be found in his invocation of the (free) market as the criterion against which we
can judge writing and its teaching. So, for example, he contrasts classroom instruction in composition (defined as dysfunctional) with the expert-novice model. In his
representations, whereas writing in the composition classroom is not real writing
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but instead merely an exam (147) or “practice” (165) for what might come later, in
the novice-expert socialization process,
Novices [. . . .] receive help in writing as they need it or want it, or it is forced on
them. If they have a particular problem with writing, they will find out about it all
too quickly and “naturally.” They will not accomplish with their writing what they
set out to accomplish. Their boss will send back their memos for revision because
they have not adequately addressed the issues they were assigned. Their editors will
reject their essays because they have not been sufficiently literary or insightful. The
city commission will reject their petitions because they have not been sufficiently
persuasive. The members of their community will provide the responses, the feedback,
the criticism they need. (148)

Here the invisible hand of the (free) market is implicitly invoked as an explanation of why some writers and writing receive praise and others don’t. In this fantasy,
writing simply is or is not persuasive, literary, insightful, effective, as determined by
its “buyers” or consumers: bosses, the public, editors, those whose authority to know
what is and isn’t good writing goes unquestioned, like that of purchasers of stocks
and other commodities: the market, here as elsewhere, decides, and its decisions
are by definition right in determining the value of what is purchased. Or, as Smit
claims, “[T]he only way to determine whether novice writers write adequately is to
see if their writing accomplishes their purposes outside the classroom in the larger
‘marketplace’” (156). Smit follows this claim with a demurral—“not all writing must
accomplish real effects in the world analogous to a company selling a product”—but
then reasserts the rightness of the marketplace: “[W]ithout the constraints of that
larger marketplace, how do instructors go about determining what students need to
know in order to become better writers?” (156).
In keeping with free market ideology, students themselves are also identified
as the free agents of the learning marketplace: the consumers who by definition are
always right and whose desires are both fixed and entirely their own.
[S]tudents are responsible for their own choices, their own goals, their own values, and
we are bound to respect those choices, those goals and values. [. . .] [W]e cannot set
ourselves up as experts in ends, in what students might choose to do with their lives.
We can only offer our judgment of means. [. . .] give them as much help as possible
in choosing the ends they wish to pursue. (Smit 192)6

Hence Smit argues that course descriptions should “specify the purpose of the writing required in the course, the theoretical or ideological framework of the course,
and the discourse community to which the course is designed to introduce students”
(192). But while it seems indisputable that course descriptions should not deliberately
mislead students, and that students, like their teachers, should have their current
views acknowledged and taken seriously (not to be confused with being taken uncritically), it is also patently obvious that, once we relocate work in composition as
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material social practice, no course description can fully represent what students, or
their instructors, will encounter or produce in a course, and that individual as well
as collective student needs, desires, views, and beliefs, like those of other humans,
are inevitably in flux, diverse, often contradictory, and not fully or readily available
either to them or their instructors for inspection.
It is Smit’s free market fantasy model that requires a transmission model of
pedagogy, which in Smit extends to the demand for a “truth in advertising” of
course descriptions whereby teachers must tell the student consumers what those
enrolling will be getting, and, of course, teachers must then deliver what’s promised,
and students are assumed to know what they want and will need. This is the same
assumed model behind the current wave of demands for (school) accountability,
requirements for statements of “learning outcomes” for all courses, and so on. It is
a model that elides the overdetermined character of any educational work in favor
of a simplistic model of learning as information or skill transfer, and of knowledge
as commodity. As in those demands, Smit treats the complexity of such work not as
a problematic but as a problem, something to be avoided or eliminated rather than
engaged. Thus, although Smit makes the occasional nod toward the possibility of
change and difference resulting from student apprenticeships with the discourse
communities they have somehow chosen to join, his general argument is to make
writing instruction more efficient in delivering specific writing skills demanded by
employers and therefore, it is assumed, desired by the students as (simply, only)
future employees. Having established for himself that no general writing skills exist
to be transmitted, he argues for transmission of writing skills specific to particular
disciplines and work sites and is disturbed at the extent to which composition courses
fail at this task, asking rhetorically,
[I]f school genres lack sufficient context to help students grapple with all of the rhetorical constraints they will confront in the world at large, just how useful are they in
preparing students to write for that world? [. . .] [W]hat sort of “real-world” genres
are writing classes supposed to be training students to write? Or what sort of skills
are school genres supposed to be honing that will transfer to writing outside of the
classroom? (148)

The fact that “what students write in college does not sufficiently prepare them for
writing in the workplace or in other nonacademic settings” (153) is seen as a flaw
in composition pedagogy to be corrected or lamented, not an inevitability to be
engaged, explored, embraced.
We thus see in Smit’s argument a treatment of writing as a stable entity and
pedagogy as (ideally) the means to transmit skill in producing it efficiently, in alignment with status quo power relations and hegemonic ideals. Composition’s past,
and its knowledge, are treated as knowable and known; difference is understood
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not as the norm of writing but as deviation from a norm of sameness, with varieties
of writing as each internally uniform rather than in flux and in fluctuating relation
with one another. Practice is something following research and theory rather than
in dialectical relation with it: classrooms are where theory and research are to be
applied rather than the site of theorizing and (real, versus a simulacrum of) research.
Rewriting Composition as Hegemony in
Student Training and Management

On its surface, Dobrin’s Postcomposition would seem to represent the complete counterargument to Smit’s The End of Composition Studies. In fact, Smit had positioned his
argument against earlier arguments Dobrin (in Constructing Knowledges) and others
had made against a concern with pedagogy as evidence of the field being “mired in
a Hamlet-like ambivalence about what it knows, what it ought to do, and whether it
has the means or the will to decide” (Smit 7). And in turn, in Postcomposition, Dobrin
positions his argument against Smit’s (and similar arguments) insofar as Smit concerns
himself “within a rubric of classroom and student” (Dobrin, Postcomposition 10). A
full consideration of Dobrin’s argument in Postcomposition is beyond the scope of this
essay. For my purposes here, what merits attention is the continuation in Dobrin’s
argument of the same discourse of need by which composition is deemed lacking,
a discourse that accepts the dominant’s terms for composition and its alternatives,
landing Dobrin’s argument, like Smit’s, firmly in the lap of the hegemonic, notwithstanding his efforts to the contrary.
Like Smit, Dobrin declares composition as at an end, something we should abandon in light of its putative limitations. But while, for Smit, composition is at an end
because of the failure of composition pedagogy to meet the needs of the dominant,
Dobrin calls for composition studies to break with the “pedagogical imperative” (as
well as the “administrative” imperative) and with student subjectivities altogether
in favor of pursuing writing/theory. For Dobrin identifies composition itself as defined (limited, hobbled) by its commitment to pedagogy and the administration of
pedagogy and of student subjectivities. As he puts it, the difficulty with composition
is its “inability to articulate an intellectual focus beyond the training of teachers, an
activity set in service of the continued management of student bodies rather than in
pursuit of understanding of writing in the formation of the signifier ‘student’” (18;
emphasis added). Given a view of pedagogy as “training” and “management,” composition, for Dobrin, is not worth keeping to. In place of composition, so defined,
Dobrin argues for the study of writing, defined as a “producing machine” of subjects
and subjectivity, a study that will “reconfigur[e] [. . .] the subject as posthuman, nonautonomous agent” (17).
At various moments in Postcomposition, it appears that Dobrin’s project is meant
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to spur rethinking of the terms defining composition in ways aligned with the argument I am making here. For example, Dobrin explains that postcomposition is not
“no-student” but, rather, “post-student as student is currently conceived” (15), and
that postcomposition is meant to enable us to “think ‘differently’ about writing than
disciplinary limits have previously allowed or encouraged” (189). In such statements,
there is the potential to rethink conceptions of student and, by implication, pedagogy
(and, of course, writing). But that potential is undercut by Dobrin’s acceptance of
dominant conceptions of pedagogy.7 For in the same breath as he argues for being
“post-student as student is currently conceived,” he insists that postcomposition is
“certainly postpedagogy.” This acceptance of dominant conceptions of composition
pedagogy is confirmed by his call for the work of theorizing writing, understood as
“not the work of a teaching subject nor dependent upon the role students play in
making writing an object of study” but as something that “is—and must be—bigger
than the idea of students” (15).
Thus, although Dobrin’s argument is clearly opposed to those, like Smit’s,
concerned with producing a more efficient composition pedagogy for students,
and would seem to share the aim of my argument for the need to rethink the field’s
discourse, his argument, like Smit’s, assumes a debased view of the work of composition—most prominently, pedagogy and work at the pedagogical scene. His argument
differs from Smit’s only in choosing to abandon that work rather than replace it with
WID. And so, while he offers no idealist or fantasy portrait of how writing pedagogy
should work, what he does propose is no less idealist—that is, removed from material social history—than Smit’s proposed “solution.” In place of composition, with
its “neurosis of pedagogy” (28), Dobrin advocates what he terms “writing studies”
(25–28). But it is a “writing studies” largely removed from the material social realm.
We can see this removal by comparing his articulation of what writing studies
might be to otherwise similar calls for a shift from composition studies to writing
studies (see, for example, Bazerman, “Case”; Trimbur, “Changing”). For Dobrin’s
references to writing studies ignore large swaths of scholarship that can already lay
claim to such a name, and he dismisses much of the theorizing of writing affiliated
with composition while conflating particular writing practices associated with digital
communication technologies with writing tout court. For example, given Dobrin’s
hearty “Amen” to Charles Bazerman’s call to broaden composition’s focus to attend
to the full panoply of writing practices (Dobrin, Postcomposition 25–26), we might
expect Dobrin will consider at least some instances drawn from the hefty reams
of scholarship in literacy studies focusing on these practices.8 But in fact, no such
instances make any appearance in Postcomposition. Instead, writing studies appears
to be only just emerging ex nihilo in the work of a handful of theorists: something
new and at odds with all that has come before—one reason Dobrin postulates for
the difficulty of the work of theorizing writing.
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Likewise, the theorizing of writing in terms of such matters as “ideologies,
politics, subjectivities, agencies, identities, discourses, rhetorics, and grammars” is
dismissed from consideration insofar as these are issues “composition studies has
come to be so invested in,” on the supposition that talk about such issues serves
merely to enable composition theorists to talk “about the things that other theorists
in English studies talk about” and thereby “gives claim to legitimacy” (Dobrin 25).
This dismissal effectively clears the field of theorizing by deeming (at least some)
extant theorizing something else. That is, although we must theorize writing, not all
theorizing counts as such. The theorizing of writing in which composition students
engage, for example, remains invisible. And in Dobrin’s own theorizing, writing is
more invoked than defined, except in tautological terms (“writing as writing”), and
largely as a singular, noncount abstraction, not as the diverse set of material social
practices documented in, well, writing studies scholarship.
At certain points, Dobrin appears to recognize the corner into which he’s painted
himself, complaining of the frustration and difficulty of “trying to identify writing as
independent from other phenomena and the dangers in trying to essentialize writing
as a scientific (positivist) thing devoid of ecological/textual/network connection to
other phenomena” (24–25). Encouragingly, he rejects the idea that “the phenomena
of writing can be/should be identified in an a-contextual, vacuous state not related
to other phenomena.” But he then insists that we cannot understand writing’s relationships to these until we “understand what the phenomena of writing are and,
in turn, how writing functions to produce other phenomena”—that is, writing as
distinct first cause (25).
Dobrin accounts for his frustration and difficulty as the consequence of “a
discursive encampment in the boundaries of composition studies” (25). But I am
arguing, instead, that it is the theoretical framing of writing that leads Dobrin
into difficulties, for that framing simultaneously grants to writing a purely abstract
significance, like God, on the one hand, and, on the other, anchors it in what has
already become a stale set of beliefs about the role of global digital communication
technologies in redefining what constitutes “writing” and “what the phenomena of
writing are” (25). As in Smit’s treatment of writing as a noncount, internally uniform and discrete entity, Dobrin treats writing as similarly singular in its essence.
“Writing,” Dobrin asserts, “resists metaphor as a means of explanation both in its
complexity and in its instability” (134), for “writing is unique in its systemicity in that
theorizing it does not require a metaphor to explain what it carries or represents, as
what it carries or represents is either not as important as writing itself or else writing does not carry or represent anything beyond or outside itself” (150; emphasis
added). Simultaneously, the one reference to writing as material practice that Dobrin
repeatedly reiterates identifies writing specifically with the “current hyper-circulatory
condition of writing,” a condition that, it is claimed, “now demands more complex
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theories than composition studies has previously provided,” such as “ecological or
posthuman rhetorics” (142).
The contradiction between Dobrin’s call for writing studies and his failure
to acknowledge or engage the plethora of extant work in writing studies points to
significant limitations in the theorizing of theory itself. For while Dobrin offers
postcomposition as a response to real, often seemingly intractable, difficulties of
pedagogical and administrative work, theory is used not to rethink these but, instead,
as a means of leaving the seeming difficulties of pedagogy and administrative work
behind. This is in sharp contrast, for example, to Lynn Worsham’s description of
theory as the “never-ending work of making ‘really free’ places, lives, and identities,”
“a deadly serious matter” that, in composition, takes the form of “both the writing
that scholars in composition studies must do and the writing that we must teach,”
“driven by a passionate political consciousness [. . .] that seeks the conceptual tools,
the explanatory frameworks, to engineer social change,” “[c]oming to terms with
the real world” by bridging “the chasm between the actual and the possible” (104,
103; see also Resnick and Wolff 37). Likewise, in “Toward a Theory of Theory
in Composition,” James Zebroski sees theory as a practice to be engaged through
teaching, observing that characterizations of composition as merely the object of
critique by Theory (sic) fail to do “justice to the complexity of thinking that occurs
when a composition teacher works with a student on the production of a text” (31).
For writers like Worsham and Zebroski, theory is not an escape from places,
lives, and identities but imbricated in and a means of acting on these. Conversely, as
Dobrin himself puts it in his postscript to Postcomposition, “Postcomposition moves
forward, not bound by rethinking, reassessing, or reworking the past but by looking to
new frontiers for composition theory” (210; emphases added). Pedagogy, rather than
being rethought, is simply left to its own (old) ways, ostensibly at best as the site for
application of research, in exchange for the new, relatively unexplored and hence
relatively unknown world of “theory.” While aligning himself with Paulo Freire’s
famous critique of the “narration sickness” of banking pedagogy, Dobrin does not,
as Freire does, rethink and propose an alternative (for example, “problem-posing”)
pedagogy but, instead, washes his hands of pedagogy altogether, advising us to “stop
talking about teaching” (Dobrin 191, 190).
As suggested by Dobrin’s metaphors of moving “forward” to “new frontiers,”
and his identification of his abstracted theorizing of “writing” as open complex system with what he repeatedly identifies as the “hyper-circulatory nature of writing
and the drastic technological shifts we are witnessing regarding the (re)circulation
of writing” (160; for reiterations, see 83, 133, 137, 142, 185), Dobrin’s project of
moving postcomposition lands him firmly in the ideology of dominant discourses
heralding a communicative globalism aligned with fast capitalist ideals of constant
and rapid change, flexibility, complexity, and above all, the inevitability of these and
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their break from what has come before.9 So, for example, Dobrin insists that “the
whole world—or, more specifically, writing—is in the Web because the Web/writing is (in) the whole world, whether an individual or society is consciously aware of
it or not” (144).10 Citing approvingly Mark Taylor’s warning that “those who are
too rigid to fit in rapidly changing worlds become obsolete or are driven beyond the
edge of chaos to destruction” (Taylor 202; qtd. in Dobrin 168), Dobrin explains that
“[a]s the complexity of networks with which we interact increases and as the speed
of network-changes accelerate, the ability to adjust to rapid shift becomes necessary”
(168). That is, we must adapt or risk being obsolete or destroyed.
Further, in only a decade after Margaret Syverson’s warning that “[a]s contexts
and technologies for writing continue to change at an ever accelerating pace, we cannot cling to our familiar, comfortable assumptions about writers, readers, and texts,
or we will find ourselves increasingly irrelevant and even obstructive” (27; qtd. in
Dobrin 177), it seems to Dobrin himself that “the situation of writing has changed
even more dramatically/radically than even Syverson suggests” (177). We have, we
are told, reached a “tipping point” (177, 185) that has rendered common ways of
thinking about writing “outmoded” and that requires “creative destruction,” “wiping
the slate clean and starting anew” (188, though Dobrin then demurs that “there is
little possibility or need [. . .] to start from a completely blank slate” [188]). Those
who resist will be doomed as “obstructive,” “outmoded,” “obsolete,” “irrelevant,”
and therefore quite justifiably “driven to destruction.” To this imperative, it seems,
There Is No Alternative.
This is not, of course, to deny changes to communication technologies, the
pace of these changes, and the importance of attending to these, any more than
we should deny the fact of “market pressures” on writers. But it is to insist on also
acknowledging (1) the ongoing, incomplete, varied, and uneven distribution and
“development” of these changes; (2) the simultaneous presence and interaction of
other, competing technologies; and (3) consequently, the indeterminate character of
the effect of these changes on writing and culture more broadly, with, as complexity
theory itself insists, unintended, even unimaginable consequences as communication
technologies interact in overdetermined ways with other phenomena. In short, it is
to refuse to accept pretensions of the hegemonic to hegemony.
Rethinking Terms

of

Disciplinary Discourse

By way of illustrative contrast to the discourse of need in Smit’s and Dobrin’s arguments, I turn briefly to the strategies deployed in two disparate critical works:
Gibson-Graham’s project against capitalism and Lillis’s project for a sociolinguistics
of writing. Both, like Dobrin’s and Smit’s, respond to significant limitations in an
existing field: economics and sociolinguistics, respectively. Both can be characterized
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as intensely theoretical. However, in these works, theory (and research) are taken
up not as an alternative to but an engagement in and with the material social realm.
Or to be more precise, these projects theorize in order to rethink, re-represent, rewrite, rework, and change, rather than escape from or leave behind, the terms (and
practices) of the disciplines they critique.
In a series of papers and in two books whose titles eerily echo those of Smit
and Dobrin—The End of Capitalism and Post-Capitalism—Gibson-Graham seek not
so much to escape capitalism per se but, as the full title of The End of Capitalism
suggests, change the way in which capitalism is known: to put an End to Capitalism
(as We Knew It) so that “capitalism per se” can be known, and thereby responded
to, differently.11 (The subtitle, A Feminist Critique of Political Economy, suggests the
kind of difference that will be made.) Toward that end, Gibson-Graham reject the
terms in which capitalism is traditionally thought by both its apologists and its critics:
as not only dominant but total in its hegemony. Arguments operating within such
governing terms, including those opposed to capitalism, participate in and thereby
contribute to “capitalocentric” discourse that reinforces capitalism’s hegemonic position. As Gibson-Graham observes of her own earlier work opposing global capitalism, “the image of global capitalism that I was producing was actively participating
in consolidating a new phase of capitalist hegemony” (End, Introduction xxxix). To
intervene in this dynamic, she explains that, without eschewing acknowledgment of
the dominant position of capitalist formations currently, she had instead to
depict economic discourse as hegemonized while rendering the social world as
economically differentiated and complex. [. . .] Thus one might represent economic
practice as comprising a rich diversity of capitalist and noncapitalist activities and
argue that the noncapitalist ones had until now been relatively “invisible” because
the concepts and discourses that could make them “visible” have themselves been
marginalized and suppressed. (End xl–xli)

What dominant discourse had represented (and thus perpetuated) as the full
story of the economy could be counterposed to alternative, and fuller, representations
of (economic) activities. Failure to do so, as Gibson-Graham go on to demonstrate,
acquiesces, and thereby perpetuates belief, in the legitimacy of the terms of argument
postulating capitalism as not merely hegemonic but hegemony, total in its reach (see
End, Chapter 1).12 In such arguments, even alternatives to capitalism are defined
in advance as always already capitalism’s “feminized other [. . .] lack[ing] efficiency
and rationality [. . .] its productivity [. . .] its global extensiveness, or its inherent
tendency to dominance and expansion” (7). It is thus that dominant discourse, including, significantly, discourse opposed to capitalism, is, as Gibson-Graham put it,
“capitalocentric.” Gibson-Graham combat this by “cutting capitalism down to size
(theoretically) and refusing to endow it with excessive power” (End, Introduction xxiv).
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The subject of Lillis’s argument for a Sociolinguistics of Writing is more recognizably related to questions of composition. For my purpose here, however, what is
most relevant are the strategies by which Lillis calls for a significant change to the
focus, assumptions, and practices of sociolinguistics, a change that radically repositions writing, rather than only or primarily spoken language, as a legitimate and
significant area of sociolinguistics. The challenge of making this argument resides
at least in part in dominant conceptualizations of writing in sociolinguistics, for it is
those conceptions that have relegated writing to the margins of sociolinguistic research. These include the notion that writing is primarily concerned with codifying
and maintaining specific standard varieties of language use; that it exists in binary
opposition to speech; and that it is permanent, monomodal, formal, lexically dense,
distant, context independent, monological, detached, and impersonal whereas speech
is transient, multimodal, informal, grammatically complex, local, context dependent,
dialogic, involved, and personal (Lillis, Sociolinguistics 8–10). As Lillis observes, it is
this framing of writing (and speech) by dominant discourse in sociolinguistics that
needs to be rethought, its “paradigmatic imaginary” that defines “what its objects
of study are, and importantly, can or should be” (10). So, for example, “[t]he focus
on writing [in sociolinguistics] in processes of standardisation and codification hides
other ways of noticing and understanding what writing is and does in social context,
thus potentially limiting our understanding of ‘everyday’ writing” (8).
While Lillis refers to empirical evidence to demonstrate the invalidity of how
writing has been framed in sociolinguistics, she also cautions that such research alone
is inadequate insofar as it can easily be accommodated to the dominant terms. For
instance, when examples of speech are presented that have characteristics ordinarily assigned to writing, dominant discourse in sociolinguistics does not rethink its
framing of speech and writing but, instead, dubs these examples to be not “genuine”
speech (and writing with attributes associated with speech are dubbed “speech-like”)
(Sociolinguistics 9). Hence Lillis must retheorize the binary framing itself to enable
as legitimate a sociolinguistics of writing.
The projects of both Gibson-Graham and Lillis are motivated, like Smit’s
and Dobrin’s, by dissatisfaction with “the field.” But unlike either Smit or Dobrin,
both Gibson-Graham and Lillis proceed not by declaring the field to be at an end,
or abandoning the field in pursuit of some other “end” or “frontier,” but by pursuing ways of thinking that field differently: for Gibson-Graham most obviously,
rethinking the hegemony of capitalism; for Lillis, rethinking the position of writing
in sociolinguistics. And both Gibson-Graham’s and Lillis’s projects are explicitly
located in a wide range of ongoing research and theory, rather than pretending to
leave behind the old as a finite, known entity at an end, in order to seek out and
produce something entirely new. So, for example, Gibson-Graham do not propose
to abandon political economy (or the study of capitalism) for some other pursuit,
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or declare these fields to be at an end, nor does Lillis propose to abandon sociolinguistics. Instead, they theorize—find ways to think—the governing terms (economy,
capitalism, sociolinguistics, writing) differently.
Were Smit and Dobrin to follow their example, they might see that the difficulties they wrestle with are not to be understood in terms of pedagogy versus theory,
or FYC versus writing studies or WID, or writing versus composition, but, rather,
how pedagogy, theory, FYC, writing studies, WID, composition, writing have come to be
understood and practiced. Theory, for example, far from being a stable monolith,
beneficent or maleficent, in tension with an equivalent monolith of “practice,” itself
denotes an enormous range of emergent practices taking an enormous range of forms,
some of which we might want to encourage and some not. The same can be said of
teaching, administration, FYC, and so on. But it would be wrong to conclude from
what we deem to be poorly theorized or practiced theory, pedagogy, or administration
that we should abandon work identified by such terms for something else, because to
do so would accede to the impoverished definitions shaping that work in a futile effort
to leave behind composition as material social practice. What is needed instead is a
reworking: better theory, pedagogy, administration, and so on, with what constitutes
“better” of course inevitably a matter of debate and, well, work.
It might be argued (though I will not) that the consequences of the rethinking of a field’s key terms of the sort Gibson-Graham and Lillis engage in are not
as “revolutionary” as the consequences envisioned by either Smit or Dobrin. But
ironically, to argue thus would be to remain subject to the very terms, conditions,
and criteria set by the dominant for what counts as, in fact, revolutionary. I have
already suggested that Smit’s envisioned change amounts to little that is different
from WID curricula already on the books, inflected with dominant free market
ideology.13 Dobrin’s envisioned change, insofar as it promises to abjure composition as a “teaching subject,” would seem to be more radical. On closer inspection,
however, his proposed escape to the beyond of composition is fully consonant with
a dominant discourse of fast capitalism.14
That Dobrin’s desired move to escape what seem to be the limit-situations
of composition should land him so unwittingly in a far more troubling position illustrates the role of hegemony in maintaining the hegemonic. Composition studies,
for Dobrin, is treated as an undifferentiated and stable entity (identified as and with
“the WPA”), a monolith to which he ascribes an all-encompassing power: not merely
hegemonic but hegemony.15 And, accordingly, the only route out would appear to
be the same apocalyptic (impossible) escape imagined by opponents of capitalism
who accord it a similar identity. It is no wonder, then, that, faced with such a conception of composition, the only option and hope would appear to be “violence”
(113), “total revolution” (188), or at the very least the appearance of some heroic
“critical wpa,” someone who is not merely being critical but who disrupts (114). For,
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as Gibson-Graham warn, “Once we have created a theoretical monster and installed
it in the social landscape, our thinking and politics will tend to orient themselves
around its bulk and majesty and our emotional outlook will reflect the diminished
likelihood of displacing it” (Postcapitalist 199; compare Chaput). Nor is it surprising
that Dobrin’s proposed alternative lands him so firmly in a position aligned with a
dominant discourse of globalism condemning to destruction all those who resist its
good intentions. Thus, just as the treatment of capitalism as monolith, as GibsonGraham warn, leads to it “be[ing] seen to operate as a constraint or a limit [. . .] that
to which other more mutable entities must adapt” (End 14), so Dobrin’s treatment
of composition perforce renders any efforts in response, Dobrin’s included, merely
accommodative. Indeed, we can best understand claims to the violent, revolutionary, or disruptive character of such efforts as rhetorical ploys to obscure their actual
status as adaptations, their acquiescence to the terms governing thought, just as the
ostensibly apocalyptic “end” to composition studies advanced by Smit turns out on
inspection to be a curriculum well in the mainstream of composition studies.
In other words, hegemony is not so much something against or beyond which
Dobrin’s and Smit’s opposed projects move but, rather, the homeplace they inhabit.
Alternatively, following Gibson-Graham’s and Lillis’s strategies, we can recognize,
in order to break from the hegemonic misrecognitions of, the governing terms of
arguments and the established frameworks for those terms. This would involve challenging commonplace distinctions iterated in both Smit’s and Dobrin’s arguments
(albeit from ostensibly opposed perspectives): that between intellectual work and
pedagogy; that between a concern with what the dominant identifies as material
concerns, such as labor and administration, on the one hand, and, on the other,
theory; and that between writing and composition. It would involve relocating all
work intersecting with composition studies, including theoretical work, in the material social—including the academic institutional—realm so as not to stake out as
“new” territory fields that are, in fact, already long under cultivation. And, following
Raymond Williams, it would require refusing to accede to the hegemonic’s false
claims to being not merely hegemonic but hegemony: the exclusive, total story. For,
as Williams warns, “[N]o dominant social order and therefore no dominant culture ever in
reality includes or exhausts all human practice, human energy [. . . .] [Rather] they select
from and consequently exclude the full range of human practice” (125; emphasis
original). In line with this, instead of treating composition, or composition studies,
in the singular, we would need to recognize composition as both (1) multiple, and (2)
always emergent, contingent. We can cut Composition down to size, theoretically
and practically, by refusing to assign it status as an all-powerful, stable monolith and
rejecting the accuracy of dominant representations of its work.

i450-479-May15-CE.indd 466

3/24/15 8:48 AM

Rewriting Composition

Composition

as

467

Intellectual Work

Slevin’s critique of dominant work in composition and representations of that work,
and his heralding of different work in and for composition, provide a useful contrast
to the efforts of Smit and Dobrin. Like Dobrin, Slevin rejects conservative “academic”
discourse demanding conformity to community norms through deployment of terms
such as “engagement,” “collaboration,” and the “common good” (Introducing 235),
identifying it with the project of colonization (6). Slevin identifies intellectual work as
by definition opposed to such discourse: as “the critical examination of the truthfulness of knowledge created, received, and exchanged” (236). However, whereas both
Dobrin and Smit locate intellectual work outside the material realm—for Dobrin,
part of its appeal as escape from the merely academic; for Smit, the basis for rejecting
it—Slevin locates intellectual work insistently in the material social realm, including
the academic institutional realm and, most notably, the scene of pedagogy.16 So, for
example, Slevin argues that
teachers of writing [. . .] can bring into being a radical reorganization of the professional
hierarchy. The very concerns that locate us at the base or bottom of the prevailing
power system need to be elaborated, so that we can alter both the theory and practice
of English studies. Our aim, then, should be not simply to resituate ourselves within
institutions but, in doing so, to reconceive and reconstruct those institutions. (“Depoliticizing” 10; emphases added)

And he identifies the pedagogical scene as the site of intellectual work, crediting the
emergence of a “writing movement” not to theorists or researchers but to “the presence and intellectual energy of students who questioned the hegemony of received
ways of reading and writing” (Introducing 2; emphasis added).
In seeming alignment with both Smit and Dobrin, Slevin rejects “promoting the
‘field’ of composition studies and within it composition specialists,” but he identifies such promotion not with composition per se but with “current representations of
composition” (Introducing 3; emphasis added). Hence his aim is not to retreat from,
put an end to, or move beyond composition represented thus but, rather, to offer “a
different way of representing the work and workers of composition, not as a field one
works ‘in’ but rather as a set of activities and practices one works ‘with’” (3). Such
reconceptualizing, he suggests, “refines the meaning of disciplinary work to include
teaching and learning and broadens the meaning of workers to create alliances of
literacy teachers and learners across conventional educational boundaries and even
beyond educational institutions as ordinarily conceived” (3). So, whereas Dobrin
calls for bringing the attention of “intellectual and scholarly inquiry and speculation” to writing phenomena “beyond composition” because “[w]riting is more than
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composition (studies)” (Postcomposition 2), and whereas Smit argues for abandoning such inquiry altogether in favor of settling for what is officially on demand by
disciplines and workplaces, Slevin argues for expanding those recognized as fellow
scholars engaging in the intellectual work of composition to comprise not only college writing teachers and students but all those engaged with composing, including
seven-year-olds composing thank-you notes (see Introducing 50–51). And instead of
aiming to meet composition students’ ostensible disciplinary and vocational needs,
as Smit insists, Slevin argues for composition to make “other needs imaginable and
their realization possible” (Introducing 239). So, whereas both Smit and Dobrin
work within established academic institutional categories and hierarchies to extend,
end, or move beyond the present “field” in what are ultimately quite familiar ways,
Slevin calls for making composition a “movement for institutional change within and
among all levels of education and many different fields of study and learning,” one
“concerned not with remediating lack but with examining and understanding differences as they enrich education” (Introducing 52; emphasis original).
This is a far cry from either Dobrin’s view of attention to students and the
management of curricula as at best a way to “attract the attention of local resources,
garner support from local administrations, and often solve local problems” (26), or
Smit’s view of these matters as service to those higher up in the academic and social
hierarchy and the marketplace. That Slevin’s proposals appear to have garnered
significantly less attention than Smit’s and Dobrin’s can be accounted for by the very
familiarity of the thinking to be found in the latter two, their apocalyptic rhetoric
notwithstanding, and the difficulty of recognizing Slevin’s thinking, given the deviation of Slevin’s proposals from the terms and frameworks of dominant, hegemonic
discourse on composition.17 Familiar terms—theory, pedagogy, service, discipline, writing, composition—are in Slevin assigned unfamiliar meanings and thus pose genuine
difficulty, the difficulty of thinking composition differently.
This is not to say that Slevin’s own arguments are beyond dispute—an impossibility for any argument—but rather that his efforts to rewrite composition, like
Gibson-Graham’s efforts to rewrite economics and Lillis’s to rewrite sociolinguistics,
work against dominant representations of these fields rather than accepting (and
thereby promoting) the legitimacy or inevitability of dominant definitions and valuations of these. And, unlike Smit and Dobrin, Slevin locates composition firmly in the
material social realm—in academic institutions and the work of students, teachers,
and scholars—as practices in, with, and on these as “intellectual work”—a phrase
paradoxical in its root sense. Difference, for Slevin, is not something to be pursued
in lieu of composition but rather an inevitable, pervasive, and defining feature of
composition as a material social practice, located in space and time.
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Rhetoric, Writing Studies, and the Multimodal:
Replacement through Supplement

If Smit and Dobrin argue from the position of an ostensible present of “composition” to a prospective future beyond, or following the end of, composition, others
have attempted to resolve the difficulty of work in composition—its irredeemable
location in the material social realm—by aligning it with, or broadening its reach
to include, traditions, forms, and materials seen as other than or additional to the
practices traditionally identified with the work of composition. While adopting
less apocalyptic rhetoric than we find in Postcomposition or The End of Composition
Studies, advocates for these changes are aligned with them in assuming a deficit in
composition for which the presumed addition or substitution is offered as solution.
Traditional frameworks for and definitions of composition, pedagogy, academic
disciplinarity, and value are left unquestioned—the very frameworks and definitions
by which composition must be seen as lacking—and the solutions or improvements
that are offered are aligned with and work within these frameworks and definitions.
One difficulty in assessing these efforts is that, in one sense, many of the proffered changes call for doing what in fact is, or has been, already part of traditional
work in composition, but that dominant conceptions of this work have blinded us
to (see, for example, Palmeri’s demonstration of composition’s traditional attention
to “multimodal” composition [Palmeri, Remixing]). Hence we might agree with the
appropriateness of the activities called for while rejecting the claim that engaging in
them somehow constitutes a radical break. Simultaneously, however, the performative effects of these representations of composition as lacking, in need of something
else that’s “new” or “alternative,” cannot be denied: the hegemonic may not be total
or exclusive, but it is by definition hegemonic. This complicates efforts to retrieve
what the hegemonic denies and to learn to recognize, in forms and practices we are
predisposed to understand in limited ways, the accomplishment of more and other
than what is claimed. Further, we have to contend not only with dominant ways
of conceptualizing composition, but with dominant conceptualizations of what
constitute the alternatives to it—conceptualizations that are, in fact, themselves
manifestations of the dominant.
I’ll offer three quick examples to illustrate the difficulties, and possibilities, of
breaking from dominant frameworks for conceptualizing composition: efforts to
identify, or link, composition with rhetoric; efforts to change, or add to, the forms
and materials students are to work with and produce in composing, most commonly
by focusing on what is termed multimodal composition; and efforts to rename composition “writing studies.” Efforts to identify composition with rhetoric posit rhetoric
as the antidote to what ails composition, eliding the fact that rhetoric is and long

i450-479-May15-CE.indd 469

3/24/15 8:48 AM

470

College English

has been, in at least some sense, already subsumed by work in composition, if taking
forms not recognized as “rhetoric.” So, for example, Sharon Crowley has described
rhetoric as something with which to “inoculate” composition to give composition
“respectability,” albeit without success (“Composition Is Not”). In such arguments,
rhetoric is presumed to be discrete from composition yet necessary to the health of
the latter (but not the reverse): a means of enabling composition to (finally) attain
status as a traditional academic discipline, if only by linking it with one imagined to
already enjoy such status. The possibility that such disciplinary status itself may be
suspect rather than something to be aspired to is not, in such arguments, entertained.18
We can see a comparable set of assumptions in arguments that composition
needs to expand the range of types of composition addressed to include multimodal
composition. Often these arguments are couched in terms of yielding to an imperative
like the imperative Dobrin invokes, one issued by rapid changes in the communicative technologies dominating contemporary (and, it seems, future) culture, locally
and globally, that demand we adjust to or risk being annihilated by.19 But framing
the issue as a new technological imperative either to resist or embrace assumes the
radically new—yet, somehow simultaneously known, knowable—character of what
is coming to composition (or has arrived), the fixed and limited character of what
has been, and the lack of alternative to this framing of what we face: an ideological
misrecognition of modality in alignment with dominant neoliberalism’s insistence
on valuing what is claimed as new, its account of limitations (or advantages, for that
matter) to the (stable, finite, settled) “old,” the necessity of “creative destruction,”
and above all, flexibility in adapting to and providing what the dominant demands.20
Most damagingly, such framing accepts dominant ascriptions of the modalities
of particular forms, and the actual and potential modalities engaged in with those
forms, suggesting that multimodal composition is a (different) choice rather than
an inevitability, something other than the norm rather than the norm itself. Such
ascriptions reinforce dominant conceptions of composition—as opposed to multimodal composition—as modally singular monolith. But, as John Trimbur and Karen
Press have recently observed, “[M]ultimodality itself is not new, nor is it a break
from the past. Multimodality is new as a term, a conceptual terrain that surfaced at a
particular historical conjuncture, goaded by the need to understand dramatic changes
in the means of communication” (Trimbur and Press; emphasis original). Likewise,
“monomodality” is not an accurate characterization of print texts but, rather, a set of
“ideological claims” about such texts (Trimbur and Press): a misrecognition of those
texts as (modally) less than those deemed multimodal.21 Accepting such misrecognitions renders modality not an open question for composition students and their
teachers to work on and with, but, rather, as at best a matter of a set of predefined
menu items bestowed (or newly “permitted”) by teachers for students to select from: a
matter of no more than market “choice” among what are understood as commodities.
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Calls for composition to somehow merge with or be renamed as writing studies
appear to align with calls to add rhetoric or multimodal forms of composition to
(mere) composition insofar as they seek to add consideration of other kinds of writing to the writing traditionally identified with composition, or insofar as, by giving
composition a more traditionally recognizable academic subject matter (content), it
will garner composition, now renamed writing studies, more academic institutional
respectability. As Trimbur explains in his review of these calls, if composition has
heretofore identified writing primarily as “participial”—something people do—writing studies seems to render it a noun, a phenomenon one studies—“the material
manifestations and consequences of writing as it circulates in the world” (“Changing”
18). This nominalization would seem to broaden the kinds of writing studied while
simultaneously giving composition a recognizable subject matter and a justification
for “verticalizing” its curriculum—given the enormous range of kinds of writing
available for study, a major in writing studies would itself seem to be imperative
once writing is accepted as a legitimate subject of inquiry.
But as with arguments for linking composition with rhetoric or adding multimodal composition, these arguments elide the fact that writing studies, far from representing a new identity for composition, has always been part of composition—not
only in the conventional form of scholarly contributions to studies of writing (though
there are plenty of these) but also in the ongoing, daily writing and study of writing by
composition students and their teachers. That such work is not recognized as writing
studies is a consequence of the fact that this work does not follow methodologies, nor
lead to the production of textual forms, conventionally recognized as manifestations
of writing studies. So, as with calls for linking composition with rhetoric or exploring multimodal composition, we might respond to calls to transform composition
into writing studies as welcome and unremarkable, on the one hand, and yet also
impertinent, asking for work to begin that in fact has long been underway, though
taking forms dominant culture fails to recognize as such work. Worse, in asking that
composition take up work that it already engages in, such calls risk maintaining, and
even strengthening, dominant culture’s rendering of composition itself as lacking,
its work as not work at all—as, in and by itself, illegitimate.
Rewriting Composition

It would be contradictory to this argument’s insistence on the always emergent,
varied, and variable character of work in composition to identify a different end to its
work—to argue for a specific set of practices that, instead of or in addition to those
just discussed, would somehow resolve composition’s difficulties.22 But one might
imagine projects that, like Slevin’s, pursue composition work outside hegemonic
expectations both for what is conventional and for what constitutes a break from
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the conventional: projects, for example, that take as their focus work in composition that the dominant typically deems insignificant, when it does not dismiss it
from consideration altogether, precisely because it is ideologically unrecognizable
as either conventional or unconventional. We can see the contours of such work in
David Bartholomae’s declaration that he teaches first-year composition as “a certain
kind of intellectual project—one that requires [him] to think out critical problems
of language, knowledge, and culture through the work of ‘ordinary’ or ‘novice’ or
student writers” (“What” 24). For although Bartholomae aligns this work with the
project of “criticism,” he cautions that it is not criticism as conventionally recognized but, instead, a “practical criticism (or criticism-in-practice)” (21). Such work,
he acknowledges, requires a willingness to “pay attention to common things” (28)
and appears ordinary in the extreme. As he further cautions, this is “professionally
difficult. [. . .] [I]t ends with revisions that are small, local, and difficult to value. It
assumes the direct intervention in specific projects where (from a certain angle of
vision) the gains are small” (21).
But while those revisions may well appear, from dominant perspectives, to be
“local, and difficult to value,” with “gains [that] are small,” we accept such perspectives
at the peril of losing sight of the actual work accomplished through such small, local
gains. Even those gains that appear purely idiosyncratic, restricted to the individual
student discovering what everyone around her seems to already know, are, from the
argument I’ve been advancing, real and new, once located in time and space, and
the writer producing a difference, however slight, even if the writing appears highly
conventional.23
Moreover, and conversely, there is a use to the ascribed ordinariness and “smallness” of such gains. In his debate with Bartholomae, Peter Elbow has called for
preserving the writing course as a place to “cultivate [. . .] some tufts of what grows
wild outside,” protected from the academic (“Response” 90). This accepts dominant
understandings of the academic as hegemony, something from which students (and
others) need protection. But we can instead see the composition course as a preserve
for what can grow “inside” the academic site as material social realm, somewhat,
if not entirely, removed from the otherwise incessant pressure for commodification. The fact that work in composition courses can appear useless, not relevant,
insignificant, not mattering, can allow for experimentation, thinking, and reflection
of real use-value, once we come to understand these as themselves material social
practices more easily engaged in when there is an allotted space, meeting time, and
the possibility of collaboration and a project: the briar patch we can, after all, make
ourselves at home in.24
This is aligned with Bartholomae’s earlier description of composition itself as
not a traditional discipline but, instead, a “site where English [has been] open for
negotiation (or renegotiation),” and that has “enabled the expression of a funda-
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mental anxiety about ‘required English’” and “produced new ways of talking about
language, writing, and pedagogy” as what “we can never simply study” (“Freshman”
44, 45). Composition, he suggests, is not only or merely “an abstract subject” but
also “something materially present, a course and its students” (47). I am suggesting that in the familiar forms of ordinary work in composition, represented in, for
example, a composition course in which students produce seemingly insignificant
writing circulating only within the confines of that course, work of real, if always
contingent, use-value can take place, and that the material social conditions typical
of the site of such a course make possible academic intellectual work that cannot
take place elsewhere, outside such conditions.25
Likewise, at least for some of us, similar conditions make possible pursuit of
what, from dominant perspectives, seems useless, irrelevant research: reworking,
by rewriting, the known and common (and commonly known), in myriad ways, to
make it new (again). Granted, there are significant barriers that would seem to justify
despair at engaging in such research in light of the lack of support for it and the lack
of recognizable impact it may have on policy and practice.26 But I am suggesting,
too, that such despair is in part a consequence of allegiance to a mythical notion of
academic professional disciplinarity and the function dominant culture has assigned
it. To abandon allegiance to that notion does not mean we stop researching, nor is
it to hearken back to suspect calls for knowledge for knowledge’s sake, but, rather,
that we adopt a more humble perspective on such work: to take up (again and again)
“basic” research, and to do so in a manner that embraces all the pejoratives associated with that term. It is to identify the work of composition—in the twin sites of
teaching and research—as learning, which (fortunately) is an inevitability but always
with unanticipated consequences and results always local and contingent.
***
I began by asserting that composition is a historical project, the name given to work
done in US colleges and universities by students and teachers as they engage and mediate differences in written language. Dominant, limited conceptions of composition
deny that work (and its value), posing instead a “discourse of need” about composition
itself as lacking and, therefore, in need of either abandonment or supplement. Against
this discourse, I have argued that what is needed is not something ostensibly new
or different, either as alternative or supplement to composition, but instead a new
understanding of composition: a rewriting of composition as something other than
gaping need. Such rewriting requires rethinking the terms used to define, and limit,
composition: writing, pedagogy, theory, rhetoric, modality, and composition itself. To fail
to do so, I have argued, is to align oneself with dominant ideological constructions
of these that consign composition to mere service to the dominant, or worse, and
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of what might constitute legitimate alternatives or “improvements” to it. It is these
constructions, not composition per se, that threaten to keep composition shackled.
We need to break with the misrecognition of both composition and the proffered
alternatives and improvements to it in order to give full play to all that might and
does get accomplished in the work of composition.
As this suggests, we need, if not a new language, then a different way of inflecting
the existing language to rewrite composition—a politics of language in composition
theory, scholarship, teaching, and learning. This will demand the energy of us all at
every site and instance of our work, in our teaching and study. Such work is difficult,
to be sure. But once we abandon the attempt to abandon composition, we may learn
to recognize what composition might be.
Notes
1. On the ideology of professional academic disciplinarity, see Richard Ohmann. For a critique of
the failure of scientific disciplines to locate themselves as material social practices, see Evelyn Fox Keller.
On the politics of composition’s “professionalization” as a discipline, see Chris Gallagher; Jeanne Gunner;
Slevin, “Disciplining”; Trimbur, “Writing Instruction.”
2. I am of course poaching and twisting the notion of a “discourse of need” from Crowley (“Composition’s Ethic”), who has critiqued the field of composition for its reliance on a discourse of student
need to justify the universal first-year composition requirement. I differ from Crowley in identifying a
discourse about composition itself as in need, and in challenging traditional academic disciplinarity as a
goal for composition to aspire to.
3. For a different analysis of Smit, see Erin Herberg.
4. The issue of transfer is beyond the scope of this essay. For recent discussions, see Rebecca
Nowacek; Elizabeth Wardle; and Kathleen Blake Yancey, Liane Robertson, and Kara Taczak.
5. In Terms of Work (126–31), I critique the normative functionalist approach taken by several
writers whose arguments align with Smit’s.
6. Smit is explicitly reiterating a position articulated earlier by Jeff Smith.
7. For a critique of the history of reductive conceptions of pedagogy, see Mariolini Salvatori.
8. I’m thinking here, for example, of works by Deborah Brandt, Ralph Cintron, Ellen Cushman,
Anne Ruggles Gere, Harvey Graff, David Barton and Mary Hamilton, Gail Hawisher, Shirley Brice Heath,
Roz Ivanič, Gunther Kress, Theresa Lillis (Student), Beverly Moss, Paul Prior, Mike Rose, Jacqueline
Jones Royster, Sylvia Scribner and Michael Cole, Cynthia Selfe, Brian Street, and Bronwyn Williams
(among countless others).
9. On “globalism” as distinct from globalization, see Ulrich Beck 9–11. For a recent critique of the
immateriality of globalist discourse, see Thomas Sutherland.
10. Dobrin is disputing Nedra Reynolds’s statement that “the whole world is not in the Web” (35;
emphasis original; qtd. in Dobrin 144).
11. J. K. Gibson-Graham is the name and identity taken by Katherine Gibson and the late Julie
Graham in their coauthored writing. In that writing they alternated between self-identifying in the singular
(“I,” “my,” “mine”) and the plural (“we,” “our,” “ours”). I have adopted the latter practice except where
quotations from their work make it less confusing to use the singular, but some ambiguity is inevitable.
12. On the distinction between hegemony and the hegemonic, see R. Williams, Marxism 113, and
discussion that follows.
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13. In saying this, I echo Bethany Davila’s review.
14. For a quite different but compelling analysis of Dobrin’s argument along these lines, see Gunner.
15. We can see this invocation of an undifferentiated, stable, all-powerful monolith in the following statements from Dobrin: “In the local place of the wpa, hegemony becomes the very mechanism of
control manifest in managerial presence: curriculum, policy, orientation, practicum” (96); “In no way
can the local wpa operate outside of the context of the WPA. The wpa and the WPA are inseparable
parts of the larger complex administrative system” (97); “There can be no composition studies without
the WPA in the same way that there can be no WPA or wpa without composition studies” (100); “[N]o
local wpa can exist outside of the formation of the WPA Empire, that all wpas feed the WPA Empire.
Any local work toward emancipation is always work in support of the Empire’s homogenization” (110);
“The wpa is the occupied body used—not empowered—by the WPA. The WPA, then, is constituted
by multiple wpa bodies giving subjectivity and authority over to the WPA” (219); “Theory attached to
classroom practice is necessarily, always already co-opted and cannot, by definition, be emancipatory
since classroom practice is sanctioned by the institution” (13).
16. For a similar perspective, see Zebroski, 32 and passim.
17. According to Google Scholar, as of the time this essay was being written, Slevin’s book, published
in 2001, had been cited in twenty-seven sources; Smit’s book, published in 2004, had been cited in seventythree sources, almost three times as many. Dobrin’s book, published in 2011 (ten years after Slevin’s)
had already been cited in twelve sources, almost half the number accrued by Slevin but in one-sixth the
time that Slevin’s book has been available.
18. For a fuller discussion of conceptions of the relations between rhetoric and composition, see
Bruce Horner and Min-Zhan Lu.
19. We can see the pressures of this imperative leading Kathleen Blake Yancey, for example, to
admit, in her CCCC Chair’s Address, to wondering “if in some pretty important ways and within the
relatively short space of not quite ten years, we [in composition] may already have become anachronistic”
(302). For a critique of ideologies of modality and an argument for the need for an ideological model of
modality, see Street, “Future” 29–32.
20. On notions of flexibility in the ideology of fast capitalism, see Zygmunt Bauman 104–5.
21. Compare Kress’s observation that “no text can exist in a single mode, [. . .] all texts are always
multimodal” (187; see also Shipka 11–13). Cindy Selfe, Tim Lockridge, and I explore the implications of
taking multimodality—or, rather, transmodality, along with translinguality—as the norm of composition
in Horner, Lockridge, and Selfe, “Translinguality, Transmodality, and Difference.”
22. Further, it must be acknowledged that insofar as any and every iteration of any traditional or
seemingly unconventional practice in composition (teaching, learning, study, writing) produces difference, it merits critical attention. So, for example, practices seemingly aligned with the calls critiqued here
might well engage, in given locations, the always emergent work of composition despite the justifications
offered for such practices by these calls.
23. As Alastair Pennycook observes, even “small, unintentional slippages, changes to the ways we
do and say things,” may start to be repeated and become sedimented practices (Language 49).
24. If this seems to counsel retreat, and admittedly may risk mere retreat, it is equally likely that
the appearance of retreat constitutes a further misrecognition of what counts as of real potential use (pace
Gibson-Graham’s caution against the dominant’s restricted definitions of revolutionary work, discussed
earlier), signaled by the implicit derogation of the significance of teachers and students putting composition (once again, yet inevitably differently) to work under conditions of such retreat.
25. I present a more developed argument for this understanding of composition teaching in “ReValuing Student Writing.”
26. On the challenges of such research, see Julie Lindquist.
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Ivanič, Roz. Writing and Identity: The Discoursal Construction of Identity in Academic Writing. Amsterdam/
Philadelphia: Benjamins, 1998. Print.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. Refiguring Life: Metaphors of Twentieth-Century Biology. New York: Columbia UP,
1995. Print.
Kress, Gunther. Literacy in the New Media Age. London: Routledge, 2003. Print.
Lea, Mary R., and Brian V. Street. “The ‘Academic Literacies’ Model: Theory and Applications.” Theory
into Practice 45.4 (2006): 368–77. Print.
———. “Student Writing in Higher Education: An Academic Literacies Approach.” Studies in Higher
Education 23.2 (1998): 157–72. Print.
Lillis, Theresa. The Sociolinguistics of Writing. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2013. Print.
———. Student Writing: Access, Regulation, Desire. London: Routledge, 2001. Print.
Lindquist, Julie. “Time to Grow Them: Practicing Slow Research in a Fast Field.” JAC 32.3-4 (2012):
645–66. Print.
Moss, Beverly. A Community Text Arises: A Literate Text and a Literacy Tradition in African-American
Churches. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton P, 2003. Print.
Nowacek, Rebecca S. Agents of Integration: Understanding Transfer as a Rhetorical Act. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois UP, 2011. Print.
Ohmann, Richard. The Politics of Knowledge: The Commercialization of the University, the Professions, and
Print Culture. Middletown: Wesleyan UP, 2003. Print.
Olson, Gary, and Lynn Worsham, eds. Rhetoric and Composition as Intellectual Work. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois UP, 2002. Print.
Palmeri, Jason. Remixing Composition: A History of Multimodal Writing Pedagogy. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois UP, 2012. Print.
Pennycook, Alastair. “English as a Language Always in Translation.” European Journal of English Studies
12.1 (2008): 33–47. Print.
———. Language as a Local Practice. Milton Park, Abingdon: Routledge, 2010. Print.

i450-479-May15-CE.indd 477

3/24/15 8:48 AM

478

College English

Prior, Paul A. Writing/Disciplinarity: A Sociohistoric Account of Literate Activity in the Academy. New York:
Routledge, 1998. Print.
Resnick, Stephen A., and Richard D. Wolff. Knowledge and Class: A Marxian Critique of Political Economy.
Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987. Print.
Reynolds, Nedra. Geographies of Writing: Inhabiting Places and Encountering Difference. Carbondale:
Southern Illinois UP, 2004. Print.
Rose, Mike. Lives on the Boundary: A Moving Account of the Struggles and Achievements of America’s Educationally Unprepared. New York: Penguin, 1989. Print.
Royster, Jacqueline Jones. Traces of a Stream: Literacy and Social Change among African American Women.
Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 2000. Print.
Salvatori, Mariolina. Pedagogy: Disturbing History, 1819–1929. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 2003. Print.
Scribner, Sylvia, and Michael Cole. The Psychology of Literacy. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1981. Print.
Selfe, Cynthia L. Technology and Literacy in the Twenty-First Century: The Importance of Paying Attention.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1999. Print.
Shipka, Jody. Toward a Composition Made Whole. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 2011. Print.
Slevin, James F. “Depoliticizing and Politicizing Composition Studies.” The Politics of Writing Instruction:
Postsecondary. Ed. John Trimbur and Richard Bullock. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook, 1991.
1–21. Print.
———. “Disciplining Students: Whom Should Composition Teach and What Should They Know?”
Bloom et al. 153–65.
———. Introducing English: Essays in the Intellectual Work of Composition. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh
Press, 2001. Print.
Smit, David W. The End of Composition Studies. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 2004. Print.
Smith, Jeff. “Students’ Goals, Gatekeeping, and Some Questions of Ethics.” College English 59.3 (1997):
299–320. Print.
Street, Brian. “The Future of ‘Social Literacies.’” The Future of Literacy Studies. Ed. Mike Baynham and
Mastin Prinsloo. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 21–37. Print.
———. Literacy in Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984. Print.
Sutherland, Thomas. “Liquid Networks and the Metaphysics of Flux: Ontologies of Flow in an Age of
Speed and Mobility.” Theory, Culture, & Society 30.5 (2013): 3–23. Print.
Syverson, Margaret A. The Wealth of Reality: An Ecology of Composition. Carbondale: Southern Illinois
UP, 1999. Print.
Taylor, Mark C. The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2001.
Print.
Thaiss, Chris, and Terry Zawacki. Engaged Writers and Dynamic Disciplines: Research on the Academic Writing Life. Portsmouth: Boynton/Cook Heinemann, 2006. Print.
Trimbur, John. “Changing the Question: Should Writing Be Studied?” Composition Studies 31.1 (2003):
15–24. Print.
———. “Writing Instruction and the Politics of Professionalization.” Bloom et al. 133–45.
Trimbur, John, and Karen Press. “When Was Multimodality? Modality and the Rhetoric of Transparency.” Multimodality in Writing: The State of the Art in Theory, Methodology, and Pedagogy. Ed. Arlene
Archer and Esther Breuer. Leiden: Brill, forthcoming.
Wardle, Elizabeth, ed. Writing and Transfer. Spec. issue of Composition Forum 26 (2012). Web.
Williams, Bronwyn. Shimmering Literacies: Popular Culture and Reading and Writing Online. New York:
Lang, 2009. Print.
Williams, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977. Print.

i450-479-May15-CE.indd 478

3/24/15 8:48 AM

Rewriting Composition

479

Worsham, Lynn. “Coming to Terms: Theory, Writing, Politics.” Olson and Worsham 101–14.
Yancey, Kathleen Blake. “Made Not Only in Words: Composition in a New Key.” CCC 56.2 (2004):
297–328. Print.
Yancey, Kathleen Blake, Liane Robertson, and Kara Taczak. Writing across Contexts: Transfer, Composition,
and Sites of Writing. Logan: Utah State UP, 2014. Print.
Zebroski, James T. “Toward a Theory of Theory for Composition Studies.” Under Construction: Working
at the Intersections of Composition Theory, Research, and Practice. Ed. Christine Farris and Chris M.
Anson. Logan: Utah State UP, 1998. 30–50. Print.

i450-479-May15-CE.indd 479

3/24/15 8:48 AM

